Internet Identity Card - release signing key
Https Card - Internet Identity Card Ltd - UK Company No. 09168431

ALGORITHM      Ed25519
PUBLIC KEY     ecW/P2ENdZdMG3DYnkqyG2Zqu7fzcTaAbabpX44VGbY=
FINGERPRINT    SHA-256 37b4a00707104c1727e4e225d280c34373a5d3b9031472d9d9297b54b42f194d

Ed25519 is used because a verifier must be able to check the signature
with tooling they already have. A post-quantum release signature is the
better long-term answer, but a signature nobody can verify protects
nothing today.


WHY THIS FILE EXISTS

Each release of the generator carries its own SHA-256 in a meta tag and
checks itself against it at runtime. That detects transmission
corruption. It does not detect tampering: anyone modifying the file
recomputes and rewrites the embedded value, and the green tick still
appears.

This key closes that gap. It signs the release from outside the file, so
the reference is not something an attacker controls.


WHAT IS PUBLISHED HERE, AND WHAT IS NOT

The generator is not published. It is distributed directly, as a file.
What is published here is everything needed to check a copy you already
hold:

  release-key.pub                                  the public key
  internet-identity-card-v10_2_2.html.sig          detached signature
  internet-identity-card-v10_2_2.html.manifest.json  signed release record

If your copy of the generator does not match the hash and signature
below, it is not the release we published, whatever it looks like.


HOW TO VERIFY A RELEASE

1. Confirm this key is genuinely ours. Compare the fingerprint above
   against the independently published copies:

     - this file, https://www.internetidentitycard.com/release-key.txt
     - the Zenodo record (timestamped by CERN, immutable after deposit)
     - the blockchain anchor of the release manifest

   The Zenodo and blockchain copies are the ones that matter: they are
   outside our control after publication, which is what makes them
   evidence rather than assertion. If the fingerprints disagree, stop.

2. Check the artifact hash against the release manifest.

     shasum -a 256 internet-identity-card-v10_2_2.html

   The value must match SHA-256 below and the "sha256" field of the
   manifest.

3. Verify the detached signature. With Python and PyNaCl:

     python3 -c "
     import base64,sys
     from nacl.signing import VerifyKey
     vk=VerifyKey(base64.b64decode(open('release-key.pub').read().strip()))
     vk.verify(open(sys.argv[1],'rb').read(),
               base64.b64decode(open(sys.argv[2]).read().strip()))
     print('signature valid')" internet-identity-card-v10_2_2.html \
                                internet-identity-card-v10_2_2.html.sig

   A valid signature proves the bytes were signed by the holder of this
   private key. It does not, by itself, prove the key is ours. Step 1 is
   what establishes that, and it cannot be skipped.


CURRENT RELEASE

  ARTIFACT     internet-identity-card-v10_2_2.html
  SHA-256      b9564a01b055813169d2683f705c6bf1cea741ceb43f8cd5225760769ca5f9b1
  BYTES        555571
  SIGNED       2026-09-20T13:11:33.906696+00:00
  SIGNATURE    internet-identity-card-v10_2_2.html.sig
  MANIFEST     internet-identity-card-v10_2_2.html.manifest.json
  PUBLIC KEY   release-key.pub


SUPERSEDED RELEASES

  internet-identity-card-v10_2_1.html
  SHA-256      a704bed1686d744f0fc01a3eb674b0eb7ef155a372799a76fc99a7ac588eb15a
  BYTES        549789
  SIGNED       2026-09-12T14:00:51.621956+00:00

  Superseded by v10.2.2. No detached signature was published for this
  release, so it could not be verified by the procedure above. Treat it
  as unsigned and use v10.2.2.


KEY HANDLING

The private key is held offline in an encrypted container and is not
present on any internet-connected machine. If it is ever compromised,
a revocation notice will be published at this URL and in the Zenodo
record, and a new key issued with a new fingerprint. Treat any release
signed by a key whose fingerprint is not published here as unsigned.

Generated 2026-09-20 13:11 UTC